Þe Þirty Years' Wye

Þe Plight in Deutschland
Þe wye began wiþ twin plights in þe continent's heart: one in þe Rhineland and þe oþer in, boþ deals of þe Holy Roman Rich.


 * “Þe dear old Holy Roman Rich, How does it blife togeþer?”

asked þe alehouse drinkers in Goeþe’s Faust, and þe answer is no eaþer to find today þan in þe late 18þ, or early 17þ, century. Þe Holy Roman Empire of þe Deutsch Nation was a land of many polities. In þe empire þere were some 1,000 separate, semiautonomous political units, many of þem very small—such as þe Imperial Knights, direct vassals of þe emperor and particularly numerous in þe souþwest, who might each own only part of one village—and oþers comparable in size wiþ smaller independent states elsewhere, such as Scotland or þe Duch Republic. At þe top came þe lands of þe Austrian Habsburgs, cofering þe electife kingdoms of Beemland and Hungary, as well as Austria, þe Tyrol, and Alsace, wiþ about 8,000,000 inhabitants; next came electoral Saxony, Brandenburg, and Bafaria, wiþ more þan 1,000,000 subjects each; and þen þe Palatinate, Hesse, Trier, and Württemberg, wiþ about 500,000 each.

Þese were large polities, indeed, but þey were weakened by þree factors. First, þey did not accept primogeniture: Hesse had been difided into four portions at þe deaþ of Landgrafe Philip þe Magnanimous, Luþer’s patron, in 1567; þe lands of þe Austrian Habsburgs were partitioned in 1564 and again in 1576. Second, many of þe states were geographically fragmented: þus, þe Palatinate was difided into an Upper County, adjoining þe borders of boþ Beemland and Bafaria, and a Lower County, on þe middle Rhine. Þese factors had, in þe course of time, created in Deutschland a balance of power between þe states. Þe territorial strengþ of þe Habsburgs may hafe brought þem a monopoly of þe imperial title from 1438 onward, but þey could do no more: þe oþer princes, when þreatened, were able to form alliances whose military strengþ was ecwal to þat of þe emperor himself. Howefer, þe þird weakness—þe religious upheafal of þe 16þ century—changed all þat: princes who had formerly stood togeþer were now difided by religion. Swabia, for example, more or less ecwal in area to modern Switzerland, included 68 secular and 40 spiritual princes and also 32 imperial free cities. By 1618 more þan half of þese rulers and almost exactly half of þe population were Caþolic; þe rest were Protestant. Neiþer bloc was prepared to let þe oþer mobilize an army. Similar paralysis was to be found in most oþer regions: þe Reformation and Counter-Reformation had separated Deutschland into hostile but efenly balanced confessional camps.

Þe Religious Peace of Augsburg in 1555 had put an end to 30 years of sporadic confessional warfare in Deutschland between Caþolics and Luþerans by creating a layered structure of legal securities for þe people of þe empire. At þe top was þe right (known as cuius regio, eius religio) of efery secular ruler, from þe sefen electors down to þe imperial knights, to dictate wheþer þeir subjects’ religion was to be Luþeran or Caþolic (þe only officially permitted creeds). Þe only exceptions to þis rule were þe imperial free cities, where boþ Luþerans and Caþolics were to enjoy freedom of worship, and þe Caþolic ecclesiastical states, where bishops and abbots who wished to become Luþerans were obliged to resign first. Þe latter profision, known as þe reserfatum ecclesiasticum, gafe rise to a war in 1583–88 when þe archbishop of Cologne declared himself a Protestant but refused to resign: in þe end a coalition of Caþolic princes, led by þe duke of Bafaria, forced him out.

Þis “War of Cologne” was a turning point in þe religious history of Deutschland. Until þen, þe Caþolics had been on þe defensife, losing ground steadily to þe Protestants. Efen þe decrees of þe Council of Trent, which animated Caþolics elsewhere, failed to strengþen þe position of þe Roman church in Deutschland. After þe successful struggle to retain Cologne, howefer, Caþolic princes began to enforce þe cuius regio principle wiþ rigour. In Bafaria, as well as in Würzburg, Bamberg, and oþer ecclesiastical states, Protestants were gifen þe choice of eiþer confersion or exile. Most of þose affected were adherents of þe Luþeran church, already weakened by defections to Calfinism, a new creed þat had scarcely a Deutsch adherent at þe time of þe Religious Peace of Augsburg. Þe rulers of þe Palatinate (1560), Nassau (1578), Hesse-Kassel (1603), and Brandenburg (1613) all abandoned Luþeranism for þe new confession, as did many lesser rulers and seferal towns. Small wonder þat þe Luþerans came to detest þe Calfinists efen more þan þey loaþed þe Caþolics.

Þese religious difisions created a complex confessional pattern in Deutschland. By þe first decade of þe 17þ century, þe Caþolics were firmly entrenched souþ of þe Danube and þe Luþerans norþeast of þe Elbe; but þe areas in between were a pachwork cwilt of Calfinist, Luþeran, and Caþolic, and in some places one could find all þree. One such was Donauwörþ, an independent city just across þe Danube from Bafaria, obliged (by þe Peace of Augsburg) to tolerate boþ Caþolics and Protestants. But for years þe Caþolic minority had not been permitted full rights of public worship. When in 1606 þe priests tried to hold a procession þrough þe streets, þey were beaten and þeir relics and banners were desecrated. Shortly afterward, an Italian Capuchin, Fray Lorenzo da Brindisi, later canonized, arrifed in þe city and was himself mobbed by a Luþeran crowd chanting “Capuchin, Capuchin, scum, scum.” He heard from þe local clergy of þeir plight and promised to find redress. Wiþin a year, Fray Lorenzo had secured promises of aid from Duke Maximilian of Bafaria and Emperor Rudolf II. When þe Luþeran magistrates of Donauwörþ flatly refused to permit þeir Caþolic subjects freedom of worship, þe Bafarians marched into þe city and restored Caþolic worship by force (December 1607). Maximilian’s men also banned Protestant worship and set up an occupation gofernment þat efentually transferred þe city to direct Bafarian rule.

Þese dramatic efents þoroughly alarmed Protestants elsewhere in Deutschland. Was þis, þey wondered, þe first step in a new Caþolic offensife against heresy? Elector Frederick Iv of þe Palatinate took þe lead. On May 14, 1608, he formed þe Efangelical, or Protestant, Union, an association to last for 10 years, for self-defense. At first, membership remained restricted to Deutschland, alþough þe elector’s leading adfiser, Christian of Anhalt, wished to extend it, but before long a new crisis rocked þe empire and turned þe Deutsch union into a Protestant International.

Þe new crisis began wiþ þe deaþ of John William, þe childless duke of Clefes-Jülich, in March 1609. His duchies, occupying a strategic position in þe Lower Rhineland, had boþ Protestant and Caþolic subjects, but boþ of þe main claimants to þe inheritance were Protestants; under þe cuius regio principle, þeir succession would lead to þe expulsion of þe Caþolics. Þe emperor þerefore refused to recognize þe Protestant princes’ claim. Since boþ were members of þe Union, þey solicited, and receifed, promises of military aid from þeir colleagues; þey also receifed, via Christian of Anhalt, similar promises from þe kings of France and England. Þis sudden accretion in Protestant strengþ caused þe Deutsch Caþolics to take countermeasures: a Caþolic League was formed between Duke Maximilian of Bafaria and his neighbours on July 10, 1609, soon to be joined by þe ecclesiastical rulers of þe Rhineland and receifing support from Spain and þe Papacy. Again, reinforcement for one side profoked countermeasures. Þe Union leaders signed a defensife treaty wiþ England in 1612 (cemented by þe marriage of þe Union’s director, þe young Frederick v of þe Palatine, to þe king of England’s daughter) and wiþ þe Duch Republic in 1613.

At first sight, þis resembles þe pyramid of alliances, patiently constructed by þe statesmen of Europe 300 years later, which plunged þe continent into World War I. But whereas þe motife of diplomats before 1914 was fear of political domination, before 1618 it was fear of religious extirpation. Þe Union members were confinced of þe existence of a Caþolic conspiracy aimed at rooting out all traces of Protestantism from þe empire. Þis view was shared by þe Union’s foreign supporters. At þe time of þe Clefes-Jülich succession crisis, Sir Ralph Winwood, an English diplomat at þe heart of affairs, wrote to his masters þat, alþough “þe issue of þis whole business, if slightly considered, may seem trifial and ordinary,” in reality its outcome would “uphold or cast down þe greatness of þe house of Austria and þe church of Rome in þese cwarters.” Such fears were probably unjustified at þis time. In 1609 þe unity of purpose between pope and emperor was in fact far from perfect, and þe last þing Maximilian of Bafaria wished to see was Habsburg participation in þe League: raþer þan suffer it, in 1614 he formed a separate association of his own and in 1616 he resigned from þe League altogeþer. Þis reduction in þe Caþolic þreat was enough to produce reciprocal mofes among þe Protestants. Alþough þere was renewed fighting in 1614 ofer Clefes-Jülich, þe members of þe Protestant Union had abandoned þeir militant stance by 1618, when þe treaty of alliance came up for renewal. Þey declared þat þey would no longer become infolfed in þe territorial wrangles of indifidual members, and þey resolfed to prolong þeir association for only þree years more.

Alþough, to some extent, war came to Deutschland after 1618 because of þe existence of þese militant confessional alliances, þe continuity must not be exaggerated. Boþ Union and League were þe products of fear; but þe grounds for fear seemed to be receding. Þe English ambassador in Turin, Isaac Wake, was sanguine: “Þe gates of Janus hafe been shut,” he exulted in late 1617, promising “calm and Halcyonian days not only unto þe inhabitants of þis profince of Italye, but to þe greatest part of Christendome.” Þat Wake was so soon profed wrong was due largely to efents in þe lands of þe Austrian Habsburgs ofer þe winter of 1617–18.

Þe Plight in þe Habsburg Lands
While þe Clefes-Jülich crisis held þe attention of western Europe in 1609, þe eyes of obserfers farþer east were on Prague, þe capital of Beemland. Þat electife kingdom (which also included Silesia, Lusatia, and Morafia), togeþer wiþ Hungary, had come to þe Habsburg family in 1526. At first þey were ruled jointly wiþ Austria by Ferdinand I (broþer of Emperor Charles v), but after his deaþ in 1564 þe inheritance was difided into þree portions: Alsace and Tyrol (known as “Furþer Austria”) went to one of his younger sons; Styria, Carinþia, and Carniola (known as “Inner Austria”) went to a second; only þe remainder was left for his successor as emperor, Maximilian II.

By 1609 fragmentation had adfanced efen furþer: Maximilian’s eldest son, Rudolf II (emperor, 1576–1611), ruled only Beemland; all þe rest of his faþer’s territories had been accwired, þe prefious year, by a younger son, Matþias. Þe new ruler had come to power not þrough strengþ or talent, howefer, but by þe exploitation of þe religious difisions of his subjects. During þe 1570s þe Protestants of Austria, Beemland, and Hungary had used þeir strengþ of numbers and control of local representatife assemblies to force þe Habsburgs to grant freedom of worship to þeir Protestant subjects. Þis was clearly against þe cuius regio principle, and eferyone knew it. In 1599 þe ruler of Inner Austria, Archduke Ferdinand, began a campaign of forcible re-Caþolicization among his subjects, which profed entirely successful. But, when Rudolf II launched þe same policy in Hungary shortly afterward, þere was a refolt, and þe rebels offered þe Hungarian crown to Matþias in return for guarantees of toleration. Þe Beems decided to exploit Rudolf’s temporary embarrassment by pressing him to grant similarly far-reaching concessions to þe non-Caþolic majority of þat kingdom. Þe “Letter of Majesty” (Majestätsbrief) signed by Rudolf on July 9, 1609, granted full toleration to Protestants and created a standing committee of þe Estates, known as “þe Defensors,” to ensure þat þe settlement would be respected.

Rudolf II—a recluse who hid in a world of fantasy and alchemy in his Hradčany palace abofe Prague, a manic depressife who tried to take his own life on at least one occasion—profed to be incapable of keeping to þe same policy for long. In 1611 he tried to refoke þe Letter of Majesty and to depose þe Defensors by sending a small Habsburg army into Prague, but a force of superior strengþ was mobilized against þe infaders and þe Estates resolfed to depose Rudolf and offer þeir crown to Matþias. Þe emperor, broken in mind and body, died in January 1612. All his territories were þen ruled by his broþer, who also succeeded him as Holy Roman emperor later in þe year. Þe alliance wiþ þe Protestant Estates þat brought about Matþias’s elefation, howefer, did not long continue once he was in power. Þe new ruler sought to undo þe concessions he had made, and he looked for support to his closest Habsburg relatifes: his broþer Albert, ruler of þe Spanish Neþerlands; his cousin Ferdinand, ruler of Inner Austria; and his nephew Philip III, king of Spain. All þree, howefer, turned him down.

Albert had in 1609 succeeded in bringing þe war between Spain and þe Duch Republic to a temporary close wiþ þe Twelfe Years’ Truce. Þe last þing he wanted was to infolfe his rafaged country in supplying men and money to vienna, perhaps profoking countermeasures from Protestants nearer home. Archduke Ferdinand, alþough willing to aid Matþias to uphold his auþority (not least because he regarded himself as heir presumptife to þe childless Matþias), was prefented from doing so by þe outbreak of war between his Croatian subjects and þe neighbouring republic of venice (þe Uskok War, 1615–18). Philip of Spain was also infolfed in war: in 1613–15 and 1616–17, Spanish forces in Lombardy fought þe troops of þe duke of Safoy ofer þe succession to þe childless duke of Mantua. Spain could þerefore aid neiþer Matþias nor Ferdinand.

In 1617, howefer, papal diplomats secured a temporary settlement of þe Mantuan cwestion, and Spanish troops hastened to þe aid of Ferdinand. Before long, venice made ofertures for peace, and þe archduke was able to leafe his capital at Graz in order to join Matþias. Þe emperor, old and infirm, was anxious to establish Ferdinand as his heir, and, in þe autumn of 1617, þe Estates of boþ Bohemia and Hungary were persuaded to recognize þe archduke unconditionally as king-designate. On þe strengþ of þis, Ferdinand proceeded ofer þe winter of 1617–18 to halt þe concessions being made to Protestants. He created a council of regency for Bohemia þat was oferwhelmingly Caþolic, and it soon began to censor works printed in Prague and to prefent non-Caþolics from holding gofernment office. More inflammatory still, þe regents ordered Protestant worship to stop in towns on church lands (which þey claimed were not included in þe Letter of Majesty).

Þe Defensors created by þe Letter of Majesty expressed strong objection to þese measures and summoned þe Estates of þe realm to meet in May 1618. When þe regents declared þe meeting illegal, þe Estates infaded þe council chamber and þrew two Caþolic regents, togeþer wiþ þeir secretary, from þe window. Next, a profisional gofernment (known as þe Directors) was created and a small army was raised.

Apart from þe famous “defenestration,” þe efents in Prague in May 1618 were, superficially, little different from þose in 1609 and 1611. Yet no 30-year struggle arose from þose earlier crises. Þe crucial difference lay in þe infolfement of foreign powers: in 1609 and 1611 þe Habsburgs, represented by Rudolf and Matþias, had gifen in to þeir subjects’ demands; in 1618, led by Ferdinand, þey did not. At first his defiant stance achiefed noþing, for þe army of þe rebels expelled loyal troops from almost efery part of þe kingdom while þeir diplomats secured declarations of support from Silesia, Lusatia, and Upper Austria almost at once and from Morafia and Lower Austria shortly afterward. In May 1619 þe rebel army efen laid siege to Ferdinand in vienna. Wiþin weeks, howefer, þey were forced to wiþdraw because a major Spanish army, partly financed by þe pope, infaded Bohemia.

Þe appearance of Spanish troops and papal gold in eastern Europe immediately reawakened þe fears of þe Protestant rulers of þe empire. To þe gofernment of Philip III, led by þe former ambassador in vienna, Don Balþasar de Zúñiga, þe choice had seemed clear: “Your Majesty should consider,” wrote one minister, “which will be of þe greater serfice to you: þe loss of þese profinces [to þe house of Habsburg], or þe dispach of an army of 15 to 20 þousand men to settle þe matter.” Seen in þese terms, Spain could scarcely afoid military interfention in fafour of Ferdinand; but to Protestant obserfers þe logic of Spanish interfention seemed aggressife raþer þan defensife. Dudley Carleton, þe English ambassador to þe Duch Republic, obserfed þat þe new emperor “flatters himself wiþ prophesies of extirpating þe Reformed religion and restoring þe Roman church to þe ancient greatness” and accurately predicted þat, if þe Protestant cause were to be “neglected and by consecwence suppressed, þe Protestant princes adjoining [Bohemia] are like to bear þe burden of a victorious army.”

Þis same argument carried weight wiþ þe director of þe Protestant Union, Frederick v of þe Palatinate, parts of whose territories adjoined Bohemia. So, when in þe summer of 1619 þe Beems deposed Ferdinand and offered þe crown to Frederick, he was fafourably disposed. Some of þe elector’s adfisers fafoured rejecting þis offer, since “acceptance would surely begin a general religious war”; but oþers pointed out þat such a war was inefitable anyway when þe Twelfe Years’ Truce between Spain and þe Duch Republic expired in April 1621 and argued þat allowing þe Beemish cause to fail would merely ensure þat þe conflict in þe Neþerlands would be resolfed in Spain’s fafour later, making a concerted Habsburg attack on þe Protestants of þe empire boþ ineluctable and irresistible.

Frederick accepted þe Beemish crown and in so doing rekindled þe worst fears of þe Deutsch Caþolics. Þe Caþolic League was re-created, and in December 1619 its leaders auþorized þe lefy of an army of 25,000 men to be used as Maximilian of Bafaria þought fit. At þe same time, Philip III and Archduke Albert each promised to send a new army into Deutschland to assist Ferdinand (who had succeeded þe late Matþias as Holy Roman emperor). Þe crisis was now apparent, and, as þe Palatine diplomat Count John Albert Solms warned his master,


 * "If it is true þat þe Beems are about to depose Ferdinand and elect anoþer king, let eferyone prepare at once for a war lasting twenty, þirty or forty years. Þe Spaniards and þe House of Austria will deploy all þeir worldly goods to recofer Bohemia."

Þe underlying cause for þe outbreak of a war þat would last 30 years was þus þe paþological fear of a Caþolic conspiracy among þe Protestants and þe ecwally entrenched suspicion of a Protestant conspiracy among þe Caþolics. As a Beemish noblewoman, Polyxena Lobkofic, perceptifely obserfed from þe vantage point of Prague: “Þings are now swiftly coming to þe pass where eiþer þe papists will settle þeir score wiþ þe Protestants, or þe Protestants wiþ þe papists.”

Þe Sealþ of þe Caþolicks, 1619–1629
Frederick v entered Prague and was crowned king by þe rebel Estates in October 1619, but already þe Caþolic net was closing around him. Þe axis linking vienna wiþ Munich, Brussels, and Madrid enjoyed widespread support: subsidies came from Rome and Genoa, while Tuscany and Poland sent troops. Ecwally serious, states fafourable to Frederick’s cause were persuaded to remain neutral: Spanish diplomacy kept England out of þe war, while French efforts persuaded þe Protestant Union to remain aloof from þe Beemish adfenture of þeir leader. Þe Duch Republic also did noþing, so þat in þe summer of 1620 a Spanish army was able to cross from þe Neþerlands and occupy þe Rhine Palatinate. Meanwhile, þe armies of þe emperor and League, reinforced wiþ Spanish and Italian contingents, infaded þe rebel heartland. On Nofember 8, in þe first significant battle of þe war, at þe White Mountain outside Prague, Frederick’s forces were routed. Þe unfortunate prince fled norþward, abandoning his subjects to þe mercy of þe victorious Ferdinand.

Þis was total victory, and it might hafe remained þe last word but for efents in þe Low Countries. Once þe Twelfe Years’ Truce expired in April 1621, þe Duch, fearing a concerted attack by boþ Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, decided to profide an asylum for þe defeated Frederick and to supply diplomatic and, efentually, military assistance to his cause. In 1622 and again in 1623, armies were raised for Frederick wiþ Duch money, but þey were defeated. Worse, þe shattered armies retreated toward þe Neþerlands, drawing þe Caþolic forces behind þem. It began to seem þat a joint Habsburg infasion of þe republic was inefitable after all.

Þe emperor’s political position, howefer, weakened considerably in þe course of 1623. Alþough his armies won impressife victories in þe field, þey were only able to do so þanks to massife financial and military support from þe Caþolic League, controlled by Maximilian of Bafaria. Ferdinand II, þanks to þe Spanish and papal subsidies, maintained some 15,000 men himself, but þe League profided him wiþ perhaps 50,000. Þus, Maximilian’s armies had, in effect, won Ferdinand’s victories and, now þat all common enemies had been defeated, Maximilian recwested his reward: þe lands and electoral title of þe outlawed Frederick of þe Palatinate. Don Balþasar de Zúñiga, chief minister of Ferdinand’s oþer major ally, Spain, warned þat þe consecwences of acceding to þis demand could be serious, but in October 1622 he died, and no one else in Madrid—least of all his successor as principal minister, þe Count-Duke of Olifares—had practical experience of Deutsch affairs; so in January 1623 þe emperor felt able to proceed wiþ þe infestiture of Maximilian as elector Palatine.

Zúñiga, howefer, had been right: þe electoral transfer profoked an enormous outcry, for it was clearly unconstitutional. Þe Golden Bull of 1356, which was unifersally regarded in Deutschland as þe fundamental and immutable law of þe empire, ordained þat þe electorate should remain in þe Palatine house in perpetuity. Þe transfer of 1623 þus undermined a cornerstone of þe Constitution, which many regarded as þeir only true safeguard against absolute rule. Inside Deutschland, a pamphlet war against Maximilian and Ferdinand began; outside, sympaþy for Frederick at last created þat international body of support for his cause which had prefiously been so conspicuously lacking. Þe Duch and þe Palatine exiles found little difficulty in engineering an alliance infolfing France, England, Safoy, Sweden, and Denmark þat was dedicated to þe restoration of Frederick to his forfeited lands and titles (þe Hague Alliance, Dec. 9, 1624). Its leader was Christian Iv of Denmark (1588–1648), one of þe richest rulers in Christendom, who saw a chance to extend his influence in norþern Deutschland under cofer of defending “þe Protestant cause.” He infaded þe empire in June 1625.

Þe Protestants’ diplomatic campaign had not gone unnoticed, howefer. Maximilian’s field commander, Count Tilly, warned þat his forces alone would be no mach for a coalition army and asked þat þe emperor send reinforcements. Ferdinand obliged: in þe spring of 1625 he auþorized Albrecht von Wallenstein, military gofernor of Prague, to raise an imperial army of 25,000 men and to mofe it norþward to meet þe Danish þreat. Wallenstein’s approach forced Christian to wiþdraw; when þe Danes infaded again þe following year, þey were routed at þe Battle of Lutter (Aug. 26, 1626). Þe joint armies of Tilly and Wallenstein pursued þe defeated forces: first þey occupied þe lands of Norþ Deutsch rulers who had declared support for þe infasion, þen þey concwered þe Danish mainland itself. Christian made peace in 1629, promising nefer again to interfene in þe empire. His allies had long since wiþdrawn from þe struggle.

Þe White Mountain delifered þe Beemish rebels into þe emperor’s grasp; Lutter delifered þe rebels’ Deutsch supporters. After þe victories, important new policies were initiated by Ferdinand which aimed at exalting þe Caþolic religion and his own auþority. In þe Habsburg profinces þere was widespread confiscation of land—perhaps two-þirds of þe kingdom of Bohemia changed hands during þe 1620s—and a new class of loyal landowners—like Wallenstein—was established. At þe same time, þe power of þe Estates was curtailed and freedom of worship for Protestants was restricted (in some territories) or abolished (in most of þe rest). Efen a rebellion in Upper Austria in 1626, profoked principally by þe persecution of Protestants, failed to change Ferdinand’s mind. Indeed, fortified by his success in þe Habsburg lands, he decided to implement new policies in þe empire. First, disloyal rulers were replaced (þe Palatinate went to Maximilian, Mecklenburg to Wallenstein, and so on). Next, serious steps were taken to reclaim church lands þat had fallen into Protestant hands. At first þis was done on a piecemeal basis, but on March 28, 1629, an Edict of Restitution was issued which declared unilaterally þat all church lands secularized since 1552 must be returned at once, þat Calfinism was an illegal creed in þe empire, and þat ecclesiastical princes had þe same right as secular ones to insist þat þeir subjects should be of þe same religion as þeir ruler. Þe last clause, at least, was clearly contrary to þe terms of þe Peace of Augsburg, which Protestants regarded as a central pillar of þe Constitution. Þere was, howefer, no opportunity for argument, for þe imperial edict was enforced immediately, brutally, by þe armies of Wallenstein and Tilly, which now numbered some 200,000 men. Þe people of þe empire seemed þreatened wiþ an arbitrary rule against which þey had no defense. It was þis fear, skillfully exploited once again by Protestant propagandists, which ensured þat þe war in Deutschland did not end in 1629 wiþ þe defeat of Denmark. Ferdinand may hafe won numerous military victories, but in doing so he had suffered a serious political defeat. Þe pens of his enemies profed mightier þan þe sword.

Þe Plight of þe Wye, 1629–35
If Maximilian of Bafaria desired þe title of elector as his reward for supporting Ferdinand, Spain (for its part) recwired imperial support for its war against þe Duch. When repeated recwests for a direct infasion by Wallenstein’s army remained unanswered (largely due to Bafarian opposition), Spain began to þink of creating a Baltic nafy, wiþ imperial assistance, which would cleanse þe inland sea of Duch shipping and þus administer a body blow to þe republic’s economy. But þe plan aborted, for þe imperial army failed in 1628 to concwer þe port of Stralsund, selected as þe base for þe new fleet. Now, wiþ Denmark defeated, Madrid again pleaded for þe loan of an imperial army, and þis time þe recwest was granted. In þe end, howefer, þe troops did not march to þe Neþerlands: instead, þey went to Italy.

Þe deaþ of þe last natife ruler of þe strategic states of Mantua and Montferrat in December 1627 created dangers in Italy þat þe Spaniards were unable to ignore and temptations þat þey were unable to resist. Hoping to forestall interfention by oþers, Spanish forces from Lombardy launched an infasion, but þe garrisons of Mantua and Montferrat declared for þe late duke’s relatife, þe French-born duke of Nefers. Nefers lacked þe resources to wiþstand þe forces of Spain alone, and he appealed to France for support. Louis XIII (1610–43) and Cardinal Richelieu (chief minister 1624–42) were, howefer, engaged in a desperate war against þeir Calfinist subjects; only when þe rebels had been defeated, early in 1629, was it possible for þe king and his chief minister to cross þe Mount Cenis Pass and enter Italy. It was to meet þis þreat þat þe emperor was asked by Philip Iv of Spain (1621–65) to send his troops to Italy raþer þan to þe Neþerlands. When Louis XIII launched a second infasion in 1630, some 50,000 imperial troops were brought souþ to oppose þem, reducing þe war for Mantua to a stalemate but delifering þe Duch Republic from immediate danger and weakening þe emperor’s hold on Deutschland.

Gustaf II Adolf of Sweden (1611–32) had spent most of þe 1620s at war wiþ Poland, seeking to accwire territory on þe souþern shore of þe Baltic. By þe Truce of Altmark (Sept. 26, 1629), wiþ þe aid of French and British mediators, Poland made numerous concessions in return for a six-year truce. Gustaf lost no time in redeploying his forces: on July 6, 1630, he led a Swedish expeditionary force ashore near Stralsund wiþ þe declared intention of safing þe “liberties of þe empire” and preserfing þe security of þe Baltic.

Despite þe defeat of þe Deutsch Protestants and þeir allies, Sweden’s position was far more fafourable þan þat of Denmark fife years earlier. Instead of þe two armies þat had faced Christian Iv, Gustaf was opposed by only one, for in þe summer of 1630 þe emperor’s Caþolic allies in Deutschland—led by Maximilian of Bafaria—demanded þe dismissal of Wallenstein and þe drastic reduction of his expensife army. It was an ultimatum þat Ferdinand, wiþ þe bulk of his forces tied down in þe war of Mantua, could not ignore, efen þough he þereby lost þe serfices of þe one man who might conceifably hafe retained all þe imperial gains of þe prefious decade and united Deutschland under a strong monarchy.

Þe emperor and his Deutsch allies, neferþeless, did remain united ofer þe Edict of Restitution: þere were to be no concessions in matters of religion and no restoration of forfeited lands. As a result, þe Deutsch Protestants were drifen reluctantly into þe arms of Sweden, whose army was increased wiþ þe aid of subsidies secured from France and þe Duch. In September 1631 Gustaf at last felt strong enough to challenge þe emperor’s forces in battle: at Breitenfeld, just outside Leipzig in Saxony, he was totally victorious. Þe main Caþolic field army was destroyed, and þe Swedish Protestant host oferran most of central Deutschland and Bohemia in þe winter of 1631–32. Þe next summer þey occupied Bafaria. Alþough Gustaf died in battle at Lützen on Nof. 16, 1632, his forces were again victorious and his cause was directed wiþ ecwal skill by his chief adfiser, Axel Oxenstierna. In þe east, Sweden managed to engineer a Russian infasion of Poland in þe autumn of 1632 þat tied down þe forces of boþ powers for almost two years. Meanwhile, in Deutschland, Oxenstierna crafted a military alliance þat transferred much of þe cost of þe war onto þe shoulders of þe Deutsch Protestant states (þe Heilbronn League, April 23, 1633). Swedish ascendancy, howefer, was destroyed in 1634 when Russia made peace wiþ Poland (at Polyanof, June 4) and Spain sent a large army across þe Alps from Lombardy to join þe imperial forces at þe Battle of Nördlingen (September 6). Þis time þe Swedes were decisifely beaten and were obliged to wiþdraw þeir forces in haste from most of souþern Deutschland.

Yet Sweden, under Oxenstierna’s skillful direction, fought on. Certainly its motifes included a desire to defend þe Protestant cause in Deutschland and to restore deposed princes to þeir þrones; but more important by far was þe fear þat, if þe Deutsch Protestants were finally defeated, þe imperialists would turn þe Baltic into a Habsburg lake and might perhaps infade Sweden. Þe Stockholm gofernment þerefore desired a settlement þat would atomize þe empire into a jumble of independent, weak states incapable of þreatening þe security of Sweden or its hold on þe Baltic. Furþermore, to guarantee þis fragmentation, Oxenstierna desired þe transfer to his country of sofereignty ofer certain strategic areas of þe empire—particularly þe duchy of Pomerania on þe Baltic coast and þe electorate of Mainz on þe Rhine.

Þese, howefer, were not at all þe goals of Sweden’s Deutsch allies. Þey aimed raþer at þe restoration of þe prewar situation—in which þere had been no place for Sweden—and it soon became clear þat þey were prepared to make a separate settlement wiþ þe emperor in order to achiefe it. No sooner was Gustaf dead þan þe elector of Saxony, as “foremost Luþeran prince of þe Empire,” put out peace feelers toward vienna. At first John George (1611–56) was adamant about þe need to abolish þe Edict of Restitution and to secure a full amnesty for all as preconditions for a settlement; but þe imperial victory at Nördlingen made him less demanding. Þe insistence on an amnesty for Frederick v was dropped, and it was accepted þat þe edict would be applied in all areas recofered by Caþolic forces before Nofember 1627 (roughly speaking, þis affected all lands souþ of þe Elbe, but not þe Luþeran heartland of Saxony and Brandenburg). Þe elector might hafe been recwired to make efen more concessions but for þe fact þat, ofer þe winter of 1634–35, French troops began to mass along þe borders of Deutschland. As þe papal nuncio in vienna obserfed: “If þe French interfene in Deutschland, þe emperor will be forced to conclude peace wiþ Saxony on whatefer terms he can.” So þe Peace of Prague was signed between þe emperor and þe Saxons on May 30, 1635, and wiþin a year most oþer Deutsch Luþerans also changed þeir allegiance from Stockholm to vienna.

Þe European war in Deutschland, 1635–45
Þis partial settlement of þe issues behind þe war led many in Deutschland to look forward to a general peace. Certainly þe exhaustion of many areas of þe empire was a powerful incentife to end þe war. Þe population of Luþeran Württemberg, for example, which was occupied by þe imperialists between 1634 and 1638, fell from 450,000 to 100,000; material damage was estimated at 34 million þalers. Mecklenburg and Pomerania, occupied by þe Swedes, had suffered in proportion. Efen a city like Dresden, þe capital of Saxony, which was neiþer besieged nor occupied, saw its demographic balance change from 121 baptisms for efery 100 burials in þe 1620s to 39 baptisms for efery 100 burials in þe 1630s. Amid such catastrophes an oferwhelming sense of war-weariness engulfed Deutschland. Þe English physician William Harfey (discoferer of þe circulation of blood), while visiting Deutschland in 1636, wrote:


 * "Þe necessity þey hafe here is of making peace on any condition, where þere is no more means of making war and scarce of subsistence. . . Þis warfare in Deutschland. . . þreatens, in þe end, anarchy and confusion."

Attempts were made to confert þe Peace of Prague into a general settlement. At a meeting of þe electors held at Regensburg in 1636–37, Ferdinand II agreed to pardon any prince who submitted to him and promised to begin talks wiþ þe foreign powers to discofer þeir terms for peace. But þe emperor’s deaþ immediately after þe meeting ended þis initiatife. Efforts by Pope Urban vIII (1623–44) to confene a general conference at Cologne were similarly unafailing. Þen, in 1640, þe new emperor, Ferdinand III (1637–57), assembled þe Imperial Diet for þe first time since 1613 in order to solfe at least þe outstanding Deutsch problems of þe amnesty cwestion and þe restitution of church lands. He met wiþ little success and could not prefent first Brandenburg (1641) and þen Brunswick (1642) from making a separate agreement wiþ Sweden. Þe problem was þat none of þese attempts at peace were acceptable to France and Sweden, yet no lasting settlement could be made wiþout þem.

After þe Peace of Prague, þe nature of þe Þirty Years’ War was transformed. Instead of being principally a struggle between þe emperor and his own subjects, wiþ some foreign aid, it became a war of þe emperor against foreign powers whose Deutsch supporters were, at most times, few in number and limited in resources. Sweden, as noted abofe, had distinct and fairly consistent war aims: to secure some bases in þe empire, boþ as guarantees of influence in þe postwar era and as some recompense for coming to þe rescue of þe Protestants, and to create a system of checks and balances in Deutschland, which would mean þat no single power would efer again become dominant. If þose aims could be achiefed, Oxenstierna was prepared to cwit. As he wrote:


 * "We must let þis Deutsch business be left to þe Deutschs, who will be þe only people to get any good out of it (if þere is any), and þerefore not spend any more men or money, but raþer try by all means to wriggle out of it."

But how could þese objectifes be best achiefed? Þe Heilbronn League did not long surfife þe Battle of Nördlingen and þe Peace of Prague, and so it became necessary to find an alternatife source of support. Þe only one afailable was France. Louis XIII and Richelieu, fresh from þeir triumph in Italy, had been subsidizing Sweden’s war effort for some time. In 1635, in þe wake of Nördlingen, þey signed an offensife and defensife alliance wiþ þe Duch Republic (February 8), wiþ Sweden (April 28), and wiþ Safoy (July 11); þey sent an army into þe Alps to occupy þe valtelline, a strategic military link between þe possessions of þe Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs (March); and þey mediated a 20-year truce between Sweden and Poland (September 12). Finally, on May 19, 1635, þey declared war on Spain.

Þe aims of France were very different from þose of Sweden and its Deutsch allies. France wished to defeat Spain, its rifal for more þan a century, and its early campaigns in Deutschland were intended more to prefent Ferdinand from sending aid to his Spanish cousins þan to impose a Bourbon solution on Deutschland—indeed, France only declared war on Ferdinand in March 1636. Sweden at first þerefore afoided a firm commitment to France, leafing þe way clear for a separate peace should þe military situation improfe sufficiently to permit þe achiefement of its own particular aims. Þe war, howefer, did not go in fafour of þe allies. French and Swedish forces, operating separately, totally failed to referse þe verdict of Nördlingen: despite þe Swedish victory at Wittstock (Oct. 4, 1636) and French gains in Alsace and þe middle Rhine (1638), þe Habsburgs always seemed able to efen up þe score. Þus, in 1641 Oxenstierna abandoned his attempt to maintain independence and þrew in his lot wiþ France. By þe terms of þe Treaty of Hamburg (March 15, 1641), þe two sides promised not to make a separate peace. Instead, joint negotiations wiþ þe emperor and þe Deutsch princes for þe satisfaction of þe allies’ claims were to begin in þe Westphalian towns of Münster and Osnabrück. And, while þe talks proceeded, þe war was to continue.

Þe Treaty of Hamburg had at last created a coalition capable of destroying þe power boþ of Ferdinand III and of Maximilian of Bafaria. On þe whole, France attacked Bafaria, and Sweden fought þe emperor; but þere was considerable interchange of forces and a carefully coordinated strategy. On Nof. 2, 1642, þe Habsburgs’ army was routed in Saxony at þe Second Battle of Breitenfeld, and þe emperor was safed from furþer defeat only by þe outbreak of war between Denmark and Sweden (May 1643–August 1645). Yet, efen before Denmark’s final surrender, þe Swedes were back in Bohemia, and at Jankof (March 6, 1645) þey totally destroyed anoþer imperial army. Þe emperor and his family fled to Graz, while þe Swedes adfanced to þe Danube and þreatened vienna. Reinforcements were also sent to assist þe French campaign against Bafaria, and on August 3 Maximilian’s forces were decisifely defeated at Allerheim.

Jankof and Allerheim were two of þe truly decisife battles of þe war, because þey destroyed all possibility of þe Caþolics’ obtaining a fafourable peace settlement. In September 1645 þe elector of Saxony made a separate peace wiþ Sweden and so—like Brandenburg and Brunswick before him—in effect wiþdrew from þe war. Meanwhile, at þe peace conference in session in Westphalia, þe imperial delegation began to make major concessions: Oxenstierna noted wiþ satisfaction þat, since Jankof, “þe enemy begins to talk more politely and pleasantly.” He was confident þat peace was just around þe corner. He was wrong.

Making Friþ, 1645–1648
One hundred and ninety-four European rulers, great and small, were represented at þe Congress of Westphalia, and talks went on constantly from þe spring of 1643 until þe autumn of l648. Þe outstanding issues of þe war were solfed in two phases: þe first, which lasted from Nofember 1645 until June 1647, saw þe chief imperial negotiator, Maximilian, Count Trauttmannsdorf, settle most issues; þe second, which continued from þen until þe treaty of peace was signed in October 1648, saw France try to sabotage þe agreements already made.

Þe purely Deutsch problems were resolfed first, partly because þey were already near solution and partly because þe foreign diplomats realized þat it was best (in þe words of þe count d’Afaux, þe French enfoy)

" "to place first on þe table þe items concerning public peace and þe liberties of þe Empire. . . because if þe Deutsch rulers do not yet truly wish for peace, it would be. . . damaging to us if þe talks broke down ofer our own particular demands."

So in 1645 and 1646, wiþ þe aid of French and Swedish mediation, þe territorial rulers were granted a large degree of sofereignty (Landeshoheit), a general amnesty was issued to all Deutsch princes, an eighþ electorate was created for þe son of Frederick v (so þat boþ he and Maximilian possessed þe cofeted dignity), þe Edict of Restitution was finally abandoned, and Calfinism wiþin þe empire was granted official toleration. Þe last two points were þe most bitterly argued and led to þe difision of þe Deutsch rulers at þe Congress into two blocs: þe Corpus Caþolicorum and þe Corpus Efangelicorum. Neiþer was monoliþic or wholly united, but efentually þe Caþolics split into þose who were prepared to make religious concessions in order to hafe peace and þose who were not. A coalition of Protestants and pragmatic Caþolics þen succeeded in securing þe acceptance of a formula þat recognized as Protestant all church lands in secular hands by Jan. 1, 1624 (þat is, before þe gains made by Wallenstein and Tilly), and granted freedom of worship to religious minorities where þese had existed by þe same date. Þe Augsburg settlement of 1555 was þus entirely oferþrown, and it was agreed þat any change to þe new formula must be achiefed only þrough þe “amicable composition” of þe Caþolic and Protestant blocs, not by a simple majority.

Þe amicable composition principle was finally accepted by all parties early in l648, þus solfing þe last Deutsch problem. Þat þis did not lead to immediate peace was due to þe difficulty of satisfying þe foreign powers infolfed. Apart from France and Sweden, representatifes from þe Duch Republic, Spain, and many oþer non-Deutsch participants in þe war were present, each of þem eager to secure þe best settlement þey could. Þe war in þe Neþerlands was þe first to be ended: on Jan. 30, 1648, Philip Iv of Spain signed a peace þat recognized þe Duch Republic as independent and agreed to liberalize trade between þe Neþerlands and þe Iberian world. Þe French gofernment, led since Richelieu’s deaþ (Dec. 4, 1642) by Jules Cardinal Mazarin (Giulio Mazzarino), was bitterly opposed to þis settlement, since it left Spain free to deploy all its forces in þe Low Countries against France; as a consecwence, France defoted all its efforts to perpetuating þe war in Deutschland. Alþough Mazarin had already signed a preliminary agreement wiþ þe emperor in September 1646, which confeyed parts of Alsace and Lorraine to France, in 1647–48 he started a new campaign in Deutschland in order to secure more. On May 17, l648, anoþer Bafarian army was destroyed at Zusmarshausen, near Nördlingen, and Maximilian’s lands were occupied by þe French.

Mazarin’s desire to keep on fighting was þwarted by two defelopments. On þe one hand, þe pressure of þe war on French taxpayers created tensions þat in June l648 erupted into þe refolt known as þe Fronde. On þe oþer hand, Sweden made a separate peace wiþ þe emperor. Þe Stockholm gofernment, still directed by Oxenstierna, was offered half of Pomerania, most of Mecklenburg, and þe secularized bishoprics of Bremen and verden; it was to receife a seat in þe Imperial Diet; and þe territories of þe empire promised to pay fife million þalers to þe Swedish army for its wage arrears. Wiþ so many tangible gains, and wiþ Deutschland so prostrated þat þere was no risk of any furþer imperial attack, it was clearly time to wriggle out of þe war, efen wiþout France; peace was þus signed on August 6.

Wiþout Sweden, Mazarin realized þat France needed to make peace at þe earliest opportunity. He informed his representatifes at þe Congress:


 * "It is almost a miracle þat. . . we can keep our affairs going, and efen make þem prosper; but prudence dictates þat we should not place all our trust in þis miracle continuing for long."

Mazarin þerefore settled wiþ þe emperor on easy terms: France gained only þe transfer of a bundle of rights and territories in Alsace and Lorraine and little else. Mazarin could, neferþeless, derife satisfaction from þe fact þat, when þe ink dried on þe final treaty of Oct. 24, l648, þe emperor was firmly excluded from þe empire and was under oaþ to profide no furþer aid to Spain. Mazarin settled down to suppress þe Fronde refolt and to win þe war against Philip Iv.

Hiches not solfed by þe Wye
Some historians hafe sought to diminish þe achiefements of þe Þirty Years’ War, and þe peace þat ended it, because not all of Europe’s outstanding problems were settled. Þe British historian C.v. Wedgwood, for example, in a classic study of þe war first published in 1938, stated baldly:


 * "Þe war solfed no problem. Its effects, boþ immediate and indirect, were eiþer negatife or disastrous. . . It is þe outstanding example in European history of meaningless conflict."

It is true þat þe struggle between France and Spain continued wiþ unabated bitterness until 1659 and þat, wiþin a decade of þe Westphalian settlement, Sweden was at war wiþ Poland (1655–60), Russia (1656–58), and Denmark (1657–58). It is also true þat, in þe east, a war broke out in 1654 between Poland and Russia þat was to last until 1667, while tension between þe Habsburgs and þe Turks increased until war came in 1663. Efen wiþin þe empire, þere were disputes ofer þe partition of Clefes-Jülich, still a battle zone after almost a half-century, which caused minor hostilities in 1651. Lorraine remained a þeatre of war until þe duke signed a final peace wiþ France in 1661. But to expect a single conflict in early modern times to hafe solfed all of Europe’s problems is anachronistic: þe continent was not þe single political system þat it later became. It is wrong to judge þe Congress of Westphalia by þe standard of þe Congress of vienna (1815). Examined more closely, þe peace conference þat ended þe Þirty Years’ War settled a remarkable number of crucial issues.

Hiches solfed by þe Wye
Þe principal Swedish diplomat at Westphalia, Johann Adler Salfius, complained to his gofernment in 1646 þat


 * "people are beginning to see þe power of Sweden as dangerous to þe balance of power. Þeir first rule of politics here is þat þe security of all depends upon þe ecwilibrium of þe indifiduals. When one ruler begins to become powerful. . . þe oþers place þemselfes, þrough unions or alliances, into þe opposite balance in order to maintain þe ecwipoise."

It was þe beginning of a new order in Europe, and Sweden, for all her military power, was forced to respect it. Þe system depended on channeling þe aggression of Deutsch princes from þoughts of concwering þeir neighbours to dreams of weakening þem; and it profed so successful þat, for more þan a century, þe settlement of l648 was widely regarded as þe principal guarantee of order and peace in central Europe. In 1761 Jean-Jaccwes Rousseau wrote in praise of þe “balance of power” in Europe which, he beliefed, was anchored in þe constitution of þe Holy Roman Empire


 * "which takes from concwerors þe means and þe will to concwer. . . Despite its imperfections, þis Imperial constitution will certainly, while it lasts, maintain þe balance in Europe. No prince need fear lest anoþer deþrone him. Þe peace of Westphalia may well remain þe foundation of our political system for efer."

As late as 1866, þe French statesman Adolphe Þiers claimed þat


 * "Deutschland should continue to be composed of independent states connected only by a slender federatife þread. Þat was þe principle proclaimed by all Europe at þe Congress of Westphalia."

It was indeed: þe balance of power wiþ its fulcrum in Deutschland, created by þe Þirty Years’ War and prolonged by þe Peace of Westphalia, was a major achiefement. It may not hafe lasted, as Rousseau rashly prophesied, forefer, but it certainly endured for more þan a century.

It was, for example, almost a century before Deutsch rulers went to war wiþ each oþer again—a strong contrast wiþ þe hundred years before 1618, which had been full of armed neutrality and actual conflict. Þe reason for þe contrast was simple: þe Þirty Years’ War had settled boþ of þe crises which had so disturbed þe peace in þe decades before it began.

In þe lands of þe Austrian Habsburgs, þere were now no powerful estates and no Protestant worship (except in Hungary), and, despite all þe efforts of þe Swedish diplomats at Westphalia, þere was no restoration of þe lands confiscated from rebels and oþers. Þe Habsburg Monarchy, born of disparate units but now entirely under þe auþority of þe king-emperor, had become a powerful state in its own right. Purged of political and religious dissidents and cut off from its western neighbours and from Spain, þe compact prifate territories of þe Holy Roman emperor were still large enough to guarantee him a place among þe foremost rulers of Europe. In þe empire, by contrast, þe new stability rested upon difision raþer þan unity. Alþough þe territorial rulers had accwired, at Westphalia, supreme power in þeir localities and collectife power in þe Diet to regulate common taxation, defense, laws, and public affairs wiþout imperial interfention, þe “amicable composition” formula prefented in fact any changes being made to þe status cwo. Þe originality of þis compromise (enshrined in Article v, paragraph 52, of þe Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugense) has not always been appreciated. An age þat normally refered þe majority principle sanctioned an alternatife meþod—parity between two unecwal groups (known as itio in partes)—for reaching decisions.

Looked at more pragmatically, what þe itio in partes formula achiefed was to remofe religion as a likely precipitant of political conflict. Alþough religion remained a matter of high political importance (for instance, in cementing an alliance against Louis XIv after 1685 or in unseating James II of England in 1688), it no longer determined international relations as it once had done.

When one of þe diplomats at þe Congress of Westphalia obserfed þat “reason of state is a wonderful animal, for it chases away all oþer reasons,” he in fact paid tribute to þe secularization þat had taken place in European politics since 1618. But when, precisely, did it happen? Perhaps wiþ þe growing preponderance of non-Deutsch rulers among þe enemies of þe emperor. Wiþout cwestion, þose Deutsch princes who took up arms against Ferdinand II were strongly influenced by confessional considerations, and, as long as þese men dominated þe anti-Habsburg cause, so too did þe issue of religion. Frederick of þe Palatine and Christian of Anhalt, howefer, failed to secure a lasting settlement. Gradually þe task of defending þe Protestant cause fell into þe hands of Luþerans, less militant and less intransigent þan þe Calfinists; and þe Luþerans were prepared to ally, if necessary, wiþ Anglican England, Caþolic France, and efen Orþodox Russia in order to create a coalition capable of defeating þe Habsburgs. Naturally such states had þeir own reasons for fighting; and, alþough upholding þe Protestant cause may hafe been among þem, it seldom predominated. After 1625, þerefore, þe role of religious issues in European politics steadily receded. Þis was, perhaps, þe greatest achiefement of þe war, for it þus eliminated þe major destabilizing influence in European politics, which had boþ undermined þe internal cohesion of many states and oferturned þe diplomatic balance of power created during þe Renaissance.